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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the design of distributed
detection networks in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve).
We consider the problem of designing binary quantizers at the
sensors that maximize the Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence at
the fusion center (FC), subject to a tolerable constraint on the
KL Divergence at Eve. In the case of i.i.d. received symbols
at both the FC and Eve, we prove that the structure of the
optimal binary quantizers is a likelihood ratio test (LRT). We also
present an algorithm to find the threshold of the optimal LRT,
and illustrate it for the case of Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) observation models at the sensors. In the case of non-
i.i.d. received symbols at both FC and Eve, we propose a dynamic-
programming based algorithm to find efficient quantizers at
the sensors. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the
performance of the proposed network design.
Index Terms—Distributed Detection, Wireless Sensor Net-
works, Eavesdroppers, Kullback-Leibler Divergence, Secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed detection has been a well-studied topic over the
past three decades, with a wide range of applications ranging
from civilian to military purposes [1]–[5]. A distributed detec-
tion network comprises of a network of spatially distributed
sensors that observe the phenomenon-of-interest (PoI) and
send processed information to a fusion center (FC) where a
global decision is made regarding the presence or absence of
the PoI. In order to design a distributed detection network,
the designer needs to choose an appropriate set of sensor
quantizers and the fusion rule in the network. Tsitsiklis and
Athans showed that the joint design of an optimal distributed
detection network is NP-Hard [6], in general. Therefore, the
problem is often decomposed into two design problems [7],
where the problems of the design of sensor quantizers and
the fusion rule are considered separately. For example, the
optimal fusion rule for a set of known and conditionally
independent sensor quantizers is given by the Chair-Varshney
rule [8]. In the presence of a large number of sensors where the
fusion rule can be abstracted out by adopting error-exponents
as performance metrics, several attempts have been made to
analyze and design sensor quantizers in the past [9]–[16] under
different scenarios in the absence of an eavesdropper. In this
paper, we address the problem of designing optimal local
quantizers in the presence of an eavesdropper, with Kullback-
Leibler (KL) Divergence as the design metric.
In the past, a few attempts have been made to address
the problem of eavesdropping threats by designing ciphers in
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the broader context of sensor networks. For example, Aysal
et al. in [17] investigated the problem of secure distributed
estimation by incorporating a stochastic cipher in the existing
sensor networks to improve secrecy. They showed a significant
deterioration in Eve’s performance (in terms of bias and
mean squared error) at the cost of a marginal increase in
the estimation variance at the FC. A similar attempt has
been made in the context of distributed detection in sensor
networks by Nadendla in [18], where the author presented an
optimal network (sensor quantizers, flipping probabilities in
the stochastic cipher and the fusion rule) that minimizes the
error probability at the FC in the presence of a constraint
on Eve’s error probability. In [19], Jeon et al. proposed a
cooperative transmission scheme for a sensor network where
the sensors are partitioned into non-flipping, flipping and
dormant sets, based on the thresholds dictated by the FC.
The non-flipping set of sensors quantize the sensed data and
transmit them to the FC, while the flipping sensors transmit
flipped decisions in order to confuse the Eve. The sensors
within the dormant set sleep, in order to conserve energy
and we have an energy-efficient sensor network with longer
lifetime.
In all of the above attempts, security in distributed detection
systems was incorporated as an afterthought in that separate
security blocks were added after the original system had been
designed without considering the possible security threats.
Marano et al. in [20], on the other hand, investigated the
problem of designing optimal decision rules for a censoring
sensor network in the presence of eavesdroppers. Although
their framework of censoring sensor networks is more general,
they assume that the Eve can only determine whether an
individual sensor transmits its decision or not. In reality, Eve
can extract more information than just merely determining
the presence or absence of transmission, and hence can make
a reasonably good decision regarding the PoI, based on its
receptions. Therefore, in our preliminary work in [21], we
investigated the problem of designing sensor quantizers for a
distributed detection network that maximize the difference in
the KLDs at the FC and Eve. Note that the objective consid-
ered in [21], namely the difference in KLDs at the FC and Eve,
does not constrain the Eve’s performance. Consequently, Eve
may acquire an intolerable amount of information from the
sensors, and therefore, the solution (quantizer design) provided
in [21] may not be attractive to the network designer in many
practical scenarios.
In this paper, we consider a distributed detection network
in the presence of binary symmetric channels (BSCs) between
the sensors and the FC, as well as those between the sensors
2and the Eve, whose transition probabilities are known to the
network designer. In contrast to our work in [21] where
the goal was to design binary quantizers that maximize the
difference in the KLDs at the FC and Eve, in this paper,
we design optimal binary sensor quantizers that maximize
KL Divergence at the FC while constraining the Eve’s KL
Divergence to a prescribed tolerance level. We consider two
scenarios, one where the channels between the sensors and
the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and the Eve) are
identical, and the second where the channels are non-identical.
In the identical channel scenario, we assume that the Eve has
noisier channels than the FC’s channels, and show that the
structure of the optimal quantizer at the local sensors is a
likelihood ratio test (LRT). We present an illustrative example
where we assume that the sensors make noisy observations
of a known deterministic signal. We present an algorithm
to find the optimal threshold so as to maximize the KL
Divergence at the FC while ensuring that the Eve’s KL
Divergence remains within tolerable limits. In the scenario
where channels are non-identical, we decompose the problem
into N subproblems to be solved sequentially using dynamic
programming. Consequently, we decouple the Eve’s constraint
into N individual constraints, thus allowing us to solve each
of these decoupled problems as in the identical sensor case.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the system framework, introduce the
design metrics and state the problem considered in this paper.
Then, in Section III, we consider the scenario where all the
channels to the FC are identical and so are the channels to
Eve. We present fundamental tools regarding transformations
in the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) of a given
sensor in Appendix A. These are necessary to address this
scenario. For the sake of illustration, we present an example
where we assume that the sensors make noisy observations
of a deterministic signal, and present an algorithm to find
the optimal threshold for the LRT in the presence of Eve.
Numerical results are also presented where we discuss the
tradeoff between the network performance and tolerable se-
crecy. In Section IV, we consider a more general problem
setup where the design of non-identical sensor thresholds is
considered in the presence of independent, but non-identically
distributed sensor observations and non-identical channels.
Our concluding remarks are presented in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a binary-hypothesis testing problem for distributed
detection with N sensors under the Neyman Pearson frame-
work, as shown in Figure 1. Let ri = {ri,t : t = 1, · · · , T }
denote a sequence of i.i.d. observations (in time) acquired
by the ith sensor over T time periods. Furthermore, we
also assume that these observations ri are independent across
sensors, i.e., for i = 1, · · · , N , but do not necessarily have
identical distributions at different sensors. Let H0 and H1
denote the null and the alternate hypotheses respectively. We
denote the conditional probability density functions of ri,t
under hypotheses H0 and H1 as pi,0(r) = p(ri,t = r|H0)
and pi,1(r) = p(ri,t = r|H1) respectively. In this paper, for
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Fig. 1: Sensor Network Model
all i = 1, · · · , N , we assume that the ith sensor employs
binary quantization to compress its observation ri,t into ui,t,
as defined below, using a decision rule γi(·).
ui,t = γi(ri,t) =
{
1, where Λ(ri,t) ≥ λi
0, otherwise.
(1)
where Λ(ri,t) is a test-statistic and λi is a suitable threshold
to be designed.
Let xi = P (ui,t = 1|H0) and yi = P (ui,t = 1|H1) denote
the false-alarm and detection probabilities at the ith sensor
respectively. The pair (xi, yi) is traditionally referred to, as the
operating point of the ith sensor, which can lie anywhere on
the compact1 unit-square U = [0, 1]2, which we call the ROC
space. For any fixed test-statistic Λ(·), when the threshold λi
is varied, the operating point of the ith sensor follows a curve
yi = gΛ(xi). This curve yi = gΛ(xi) is traditionally known as
the ROC curve. In the rest of the paper, we use the operating
point (xi, yi) to represent the quantizer rule γi employed at the
ith sensor. Two quantizers γ1 and γ2 are considered identical
(equivalent), if their operating points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) are
the same.
Let Γi denote the set of all feasible2 operating points (xi, yi)
at the ith sensor. Then, the region Γi in the ROC space is
upper-bounded by the set of operating points corresponding
to the likelihood ratio tests (LRTs). We call this boundary as
the LRT curve, and denote it as yi = gLRTi(xi). Furthermore,
we restrict our analysis only to those operating points that lie
above the line yi = xi in the ROC plane. This is because
any point below the line yi = xi contributes negatively to the
overall performance in terms of error probability at the FC. In
1In this context, compactness of the unit-square corresponds to the inclusion
of the boundary points (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1) within the set itself.
2The feasibility of an operating point is primarily dictated by the quality
of the sensing observations. Note that the size of Γi diminishes as the sensor
observations get corrupted due to multipath fading and/or thermal noise.
3summary, the region Γi in the ROC space is upper-bounded
by the LRT curve yi = gLRTi(xi), and lower-bounded by the
line yi = xi.
Given the operating point (xi, yi), the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) Divergence of the ith sensor is defined as follows.
Di = xi log
xi
yi
+ (1− xi) log
1− xi
1− yi
(2)
Let Υ = {0, 1}N denote the N -dimensional space of
compressed symbols ut = {u1,t, · · · , uN,t} at all the sensors
at a given time t. In this paper, we assume that the ith sensor
transmits its compressed symbols ui,t to the FC through a
binary-symmetric channel (BSC) with transition probability
ρfci . In our model, we also assume that an eavesdropper
wiretaps each of these sensor transmissions through a BSC
with transition probability ρei .
If vi = {v1,t, · · · , vN,t} and wi = {w1,t, · · · , wN,t} denote
the received symbols at the FC and Eve respectively, the
operating point (xi, yi) at the ith sensor gets transformed
into (xfci , yfci) and (xei , yei) at the FC and Eve respectively,
which are given as follows.
xfci = P (vi,t = 1|H0) = ρfci + (1− 2ρfci)xi (3a)
yfci = P (vi,t = 1|H1) = ρfci + (1 − 2ρfci)yi (3b)
xei = P (wi,t = 1|H0) = ρei + (1− 2ρei)xi (3c)
yei = P (wi,t = 1|H1) = ρei + (1− 2ρei)yi (3d)
Let the contributions of the ith sensor to the overall KL
Divergence at the FC and Eve be denoted as DFCi and DEi
respectively. Then, DFCi and DEi are defined as follows.
DFCi = xfci log
(
xfci
yfci
)
+ (1 − xfci) log
(
1− xfci
1 − yfci
)
DEi = xei log
(
xei
yei
)
+ (1 − xei) log
(
1− xei
1 − yei
)
.
(4)
Let AFCT ,AET ∈ ΥT denote the acceptance regions of the
hypothesis H1 at FC and Eve respectively, over a time-window
t = 1, · · · , T . Then, the global probabilities of false alarm and
miss at the FC and Eve are given by
pFCT = Pr(vi ∈ A
FC
T |H0), q
FC
T = Pr(vi ∈ A
FC
T |H1).
pET = Pr(wi ∈ A
E
T |H0), q
E
T = Pr(wi ∈ A
E
T |H1). (5)
where AFCT and A
E
T are the rejection regions of the hypothesis
H1 at the FC and Eve respectively, and, vi = {vi,1, · · · , vi,T }
and wi = {wi,1, · · · , wi,T } are the received symbols at the
FC and Eve respectively, transmitted by the ith sensor over a
time window of length T . Next, we present Stein’s Lemma that
addresses the asymptotic properties of the global probability
of miss qFCT .
Lemma 1 (Stein’s Lemma [22]). For any 0 < δ, ϕ < 1
2
, let
qFCT,δ = min
pFC
T
<δ
qFCT and qET,ϕ = min
pE
T
<ϕ
qET . Then, we have
lim
δ→0
lim
T→∞
−
1
T
log qFCT,δ = DFC
lim
ϕ→0
lim
T→∞
−
1
T
log qET,ϕ = DE
(6)
where DFC and DE are the KL divergences at the FC and
Eve respectively, which are defined as follows.
DFC =
N∑
i=1
DFCi and DE =
N∑
i=1
DEi. (7)
Thus, KL Divergence is the error exponent for the global
probability of miss when the global probability of false alarm
is constrained (and diminishing to zero with time). Therefore,
as a surrogate to the global probability of miss, we choose KL
Divergence as the performance metric in this paper. Note that
DFC and DE are both convex functions of x = {x1, · · · , xN}
and y = {y1, · · · , yN} in the hyper-cube [0, 1]N , which is
made up of the ROC spaces of all the sensors in the detection
network.
In this paper, we design a distributed detection network
where DFC is maximized while constraining DE to a pre-
scribed tolerance limit, denoted as α. We present the formal
problem statement and discuss the various scenarios that are
addressed in this paper, as follows.
Problem 1. Find
argmax
γ
DFC s.t.
1. DE ≤ α
2. (xi, yi) ∈ Γi, for all i = 1, · · · , N.
Note that Constraint 1 in the above problem statement
becomes degenerate for large values of α. More specifically,
Problem 1 is meaningful only when 0 ≤ α < α∗ so that it
has a non-degenerate Constraint 1 in Problem 1. This critical
value α∗ is equal to Eve’s KL Divergence D∗E , which Eve
attains when FC attains the maximum KL Divergence D∗FC .
This maximum KL Divergence D∗FC can be found by solving
Problem 1 in the absence of Constraint 1.
Let R , ∩Ni=1Γi ∩ { (x,y) | DE ≤ α } denote the search
space in Problem 1. Note that {(x,y) | DE ≤ α} is a convex
level-set of DE [23], because DE is a convex function of
(x,y). Similarly, since LRTs are optimal in the absence of
Eve (For a detailed proof, please refer to Proposition 4.1 in
[11]), Γi is also a convex set in the ROC space. Also, R is an
intersection of two convex sets, and therefore, R is a convex
set.
Since DFC is a convex function of (x,y), Problem 1 is
a convex maximization problem, and therefore, the optimal
solution is one of the extreme points of R [23]. Note that
{(x,y) | DE ≤ α} is not necessarily a subset of Γi,
and therefore, the optimal set of binary quantizers need not
necessarily be LRTs. Furthermore, the search space R in
4Problem 1 is not a simple polytope.R is an intersection of two
convex sets with smooth boundaries and therefore, its bound-
ary does not necessarily have a smooth differential at every
point. Consequently, optimal search algorithms proposed to
solve traditional convex maximization problems with polytope
search spaces cannot be applied to find the optimal solution of
Problem 1, as our problem demands a more detailed analysis
of the boundary of the search space.
Therefore, in Section III, we first restrict our attention to
a simpler scenario3 where all the sensors’ observations are
identically distributed and, where all the channels between the
sensors and the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and
the Eve) are identical. This assumption results in the received
symbols at the FC (likewise, received symbols at the Eve)
being conditionally i.i.d., thus decomposing the problem into a
distributed framework of N identical sub-problems. In Section
IV, we consider a more general scenario4 where the sensor
observations are conditionally independent and non-identically
distributed, and the channels between the sensors and the FC
(likewise, channels between sensors and the Eve) are also non-
identical. In both these scenarios, we investigate the design of
secure binary quantizers when α < D∗E .
III. OPTIMAL QUANTIZER DESIGN IN THE PRESENCE OF
IDENTICAL SENSORS AND CHANNELS
In this section, we address the problem of designing optimal
quantizers when all the sensors and the channels between the
sensors and the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and
the Eve) are identical.
For all i = 1, · · · , N , we have
pi,0(x) = p0(x), pi,1(x) = p1(x)
xi = x, yi = y
ρfci = ρfc, ρei = ρe
(8)
Since all the sensors and their corresponding channels
are identical, we remove the sensor-indices for notational
simplicity. Therefore, we have xfci = xfc, yfci = yfc,
xei = xe and yei = ye for all i = 1, · · · , N . Because of this,
Di = D, DFCi = DFC and DEi = DE for all i = 1, · · · , N ,
and consequently, the KLD at the FC and Eve reduces to
DFC = NDFC and DE = NDE . In other words, Problem 1
reduces to the design of the quantizer at one of the identical
sensors as follows.
Problem 2. Find
argmax
γ
DFC s.t.
1. DE ≤ α˜
2. (x, y) ∈ Γ.
where α˜ = α
N
.
Note that, although Problem 2 is still a convex maximiza-
tion problem, due to its reduced dimensionality, the problem
becomes tractable. In the remaining section, we find the
optimal quantizer in two stages. First, we find the structure
3In this paper, we call this scenario as “identical sensors and channels”.
4Similarly, we call this scenario as “non-identical sensors and channels”.
of the optimal binary quantizers by gaining insights into the
behavior of DFC on the boundary of the Eve’s constraint
{(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜}. Then, we present an algorithm to find
the optimal threshold for this quantizer.
We start our investigation of the behavior of DFC on the
boundary of the Eve’s constraint {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜} by deter-
mining the necessary conditions for guaranteeing DE = α˜ in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If the transition probability of the Eve’s BSCs
satisfies ρe < 1
2
, the two necessary conditions for any sensor
operating point (x, y) to guarantee DE = α˜ in the ROC space
are stated as follows.
dy
dx
=
log
(
1− xe
1− ye
)
− log
(
xe
ye
)
1− xe
1 − ye
−
xe
ye
(9)
and
(
1− xe
1− ye
−
xe
ye
)
d2y
dx2
= (1− 2ρe)
[
−
(
1− xe
(1− ye)2
+
xe
y2e
)(
dy
dx
)2
+2
(
1
ye
+
1
1− ye
)
dy
dx
−
(
1
xe
+
1
1− xe
)]
.
(10)
Proof: Since DE is a constant (equal to the fixed design-
parameter α˜), its first two derivatives are equal to zero. We
employ these to prove the lemma.
First, we differentiate DE with respect to x and equate it
to zero, as follows.
dDE
dx
=
d
dx
[
xe log
xe
ye
+ (1− xe) log
(
1− xe
1 − ye
)]
= (1− 2ρe)
[(
1− xe
1 − ye
−
xe
ye
)
dy
dx
−
{
log
(
1− xe
1− ye
)
− log
(
xe
ye
)}]
= 0.
(11)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (11), we can obtain Equa-
tion (9).
Next, we differentiate Equation (11) again with respect to x
5as follows, in order to find a closed-form expression for d
2y
dx2
.
d2DE
dx2
= (1− 2ρe)
d
dx
[(
1− xe
1− ye
−
xe
ye
)
dy
dx
−
{
log
(
1− xe
1 − ye
)
− log
(
xe
ye
)}]
= (1− 2ρe)
[(
1− xe
1− ye
−
xe
ye
)
d2y
dx2
+(1− 2ρe)
(
1− xe
(1− ye)2
+
xe
y2e
)(
dy
dx
)2
−2(1− 2ρe)
(
1
ye
+
1
1− ye
)
dy
dx
+(1− 2ρe)
(
1
xe
+
1
1− xe
)]
.
= 0.
(12)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (12), we can obtain Equa-
tion (10).
Note that Equation (11) in Lemma 2 provides the slope
of the Eve’s constraint boundary DE = α˜. Since the slope
of y with respect to x along the boundary DE = α˜ has a
structure similar to the slope of a line joining two points on
a logarithmic curve as seen in Equation (9), we present lower
and upper bounds for the slope of this boundary curve DE = α˜
in the ROC plane in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The slope of the Eve’s constraint boundary in the
ROC plane, as defined by the set of points { (x, y) | DE = α˜ },
is bounded on both sides as follows.
xe
ye
≤
dy
dx
≤
1− xe
1− ye
. (13)
Proof: Given two points a ≥ b, due to the concavity of
the log(·) function, the slope of the line joining (a, log a) and
(b, log b) always lies between the slopes of the log(·) at points
a and b respectively Hence, this results in Equation (13).
Note that the necessary conditions for any operating point
(x, y) to lie on the Eve’s constraint boundary { (x,y) | DE =
α˜ }, as stated in Lemma 2, and the bounds on the slope of the
same boundary curve, as given in Lemma 3, are essential to
our analysis of the behavior of the sensor’s KL divergence D,
and the FC’s KL Divergence, DFC , in terms of the false alarm
probability x along the Eve’s constraint, which is defined by
DE = α˜.
First, we investigate the behavior of the KL Divergence
at the sensor, which is denoted as D(x, y), along the Eve’s
constraint DE(x, y) = α˜. Note that this analysis can be
equivalently interpreted as the case where we investigate the
behavior of DFC when the channels between the sensors
and the FC are ideal. In the following proposition, we prove
that D(x, y) is a convex function of x along the curve
DE(x, y) = α˜.
Proposition 1. Given that the Eve’s channel is a BSC with
transition probability ρe < 12 , D is strictly a convex function of
x, for all operating points that lie in the set {(x, y) |DE = α˜}.
Proof: Proof is provided in Appendix B.
For any general BSC between the sensors and the FC,
the sensor’s operating point (x, y) transforms linearly into
(xfc, yfc). Consequently, we have the following proposition,
where we analyze the behavior of DFC for any general BSC.
Proposition 2. Let the BSCs corresponding to the FC and Eve
have transition probabilities 0 < ρfc, ρe < 12 . Then, DFC is
strictly a convex function of x, for all operating points that lie
in the set {(x, y) | DE = α˜}.
Proof: Note that (xfc, yfc) is a linear transformation of
(x, y). This can be mathematically expressed as follows.[
xfc
yfc
]
= ρfc
[
1
1
]
+ (1 − 2ρfc)
[
x
y
]
. (14)
In other words, a composition of D with an affine transforma-
tion, as given in Equation (14), results in DFC . Consequently,
since D is a convex function, DFC is also a convex function
[24].
Thus, for any BSC with transition probability ρfc corre-
sponding to the FC, DFC is a convex function of x. In
other words, among the set of operating points that lie on
the Eve’s constraint boundary DE = α˜, the quantizers that
maximize DFC always lie on the intersection of the LRT curve
y = gLRT (x) and the Eve’s constraint boundary DE = α˜. As
a consequence, the optimal quantizer is LRT-based, which we
state in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The optimal quantizer that maximizes the FC’s
KL Divergence DFC in the presence of a constraint on Eve’s
KL Divergence DE = α˜ is a likelihood ratio quantizer.
Proof: LetRi , Γi∪{(x, y) |DE = α˜} denote the search
space in Problem 2. We know, from Proposition 1, that DFC is
convex with respect to x along the Eve’s constraint boundary
on the ROC plane. Therefore, the solution of Problem 2 always
lies on the extreme points of the set of operating points on the
Eve’s constraint boundary {(x, y) | DE = α˜}. Note that the
region of the Eve’s constraint boundary that lies within Ri
depends on the choice of α˜.
Let D∗E be the maximum KL Divergence at the Eve when
the sensor employs the optimal solution to the unconstrained
problem where Constraint 1 is not considered in Problem 2.
In the regard, the following two cases arise:
• Case-1 [ α˜ ≥ D∗E ]: Note that, Γi ⊆ {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜}
in this case because the Eve’s KL Divergence is always
within the tolerable limit when the sensor employs any
operating point (x, y) ∈ Γi. Therefore, the solution to
Problem 2 is the optimal LRT in this case [11].
• Case-2 [ α˜ ≤ D∗E ]: This is equivalent to the case
where Γi * {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜}. Note that we also
have Γi 6⊃ {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜} since there always
exist operating points (x, y) ∈ Γi such that DE ≤ α˜.
Therefore, the boundaries of Γi and {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜}
both intersect each other. As discussed earlier in this
6proof, since the optimal solution is an extreme point of
the Eve’s constraint boundary DE = α˜, this is one of the
intersection points that also lies on the boundary of Γi.
In other words, the optimal sensor quantizer that solves
Problem 2 is a LRT.
As discussed in the proof of Theorem 1, the problem
of finding the optimal quantizer reduces to the problem of
finding the intersection points of the boundaries of Γi and the
Eve’s constraint {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜}, and thereby, finding the
corresponding threshold for the optimal LRT at the sensor.
A. Algorithm to find the Optimal Threshold
Let f(x) , DFC(x, y = gLRT (x)). For the sake of
tractability, we consider the problem of finding optimal thresh-
olds when f(x) is a quasi-concave5 function of x. As shown
in Proposition 1, since the Eve’s constraint translates into
the convexity of DFC with respect to x, there are at most
two points of intersection for the curves y = gLRT (x) and
DE = α˜, of which, one of them corresponds to the optimal
quantizer. We present this formally in the following claim.
Claim 1. Let f(x) , DFC(x, y = gLRT (x)). If f(x)
is a quasi-concave function of x, then there are at most
two intersection points for the curves y = gLRT (x) and
DE = α˜. The optimal quantizer corresponds to one of the
two intersection points.
Therefore, the problem reduces to finding these two inter-
section points and comparing them with respect to each other
in terms of their respective DFC . Moreover, we wish to find
the threshold λ∗ for the LRT that maximizes DFC in the
presence of Eve’s constraint. Since, both x and y are tail-
probabilities where the start of the tail is the threshold, x and
y are both monotonically decreasing functions of the threshold
λ. Therefore, we have the following claim.
Claim 2. The two intersection points can be found by investi-
gating the zeros of the function h(λ) , DE(x(λ), y(λ)) − α˜,
where x and y are parameterized by the LRT threshold λ.
Let α˜max denote the value of KL Divergence at which
DE reaches its maximum value. In other words, the optimal
quantizer in the absence of Eve (equivalent to α˜ = ∞),
denoted as the operating point (x∞, y∞), is the same as the
optimal quantizer for any α˜ ≥ α˜max. Obviously, the function
h(λ) has two real zeros only when α˜ < α˜max. Note that only
one of them provides the maximum KL Divergence at the FC.
In order to find both zeros of the function h(λ) = 0, we
use the bisection method where we first find the point λ∗ at
which h(λ) attains its maximum value. Then, consider two
points, one on either side of λ∗ (which are at a significant
distance from λ∗) as initial points and use the bisection
algorithm to find the roots of h(λ) = 0. We call these two
5Note that
lim
x→0
f(x) = 0, lim
x→1
f(x) = 0 (15)
Since, KLD is always non-negative, we always have f(x) ≥ 0. Also, since
any LRT curve y = gLRT (x) cuts through the level-sets of DFC and is
concave, f(x) is a quasi-concave function of x.
zeros as λ1 and λ2. Then, we compute and compare DFC
at the operating points (x(λ1), y(λ1)) and (x(λ2), y(λ2)). We
choose that threshold as the optimal choice, which results in
the maximum DFC .
For the sake of illustration, we present an example where
the sensors observe the presence or absence of a known
deterministic signal, which is corrupted by additive Gaussian
noise.
B. Illustrative Example
We have so far shown that the optimal quantizer lies at the
intersection of the curves DE = α˜ and the LRT boundary in
the ROC. But, the structure of the LRT is specific to the obser-
vation model, and therefore, it is difficult to characterize the
optimal sensor quantizer, in general. Therefore, we illustrate
the design methodology for an example, where the sensors
observe the presence or absence of a known deterministic
signal. In other words, the observations at the ith sensor are
modeled as follows.
ri,t =
{
ni,t if H0
θ + ni,t if H1
(16)
where θ is the signal-of-interest and ni,t ∼ N (0, σ2) is the
additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2. Then,
the probabilities of false alarm and detection are given by
x = Q
(
λ
σ
)
, y = Q
(
λ− θ
σ
)
(17)
where Q(·) is the tail probability of the standard normal
distribution N (0, 1).
Substituting Equation (17) in Equation (2), we obtain the
KL Divergence at the sensor, which is observed to be concave
for this example. Therefore, as stated in Claim 1, the optimum
quantizer is given by the intersection of the LRT boundary in
the ROC with the Eve’s constraint DE = α˜.
Note that Equation (17) is a parameterization of the LRT
boundary, where both the ROC’s coordinates are parameterized
with the threshold of the LRT. Since we are interested in the
intersection of the LRT’s boundary in the ROC with the Eve’s
constraint DE = α˜, we substitute xe = ρe+(1−2ρe)Q
(
λ
σ
)
and ye = ρe + (1− 2ρe)Q
(
λ− θ
σ
)
in DE to obtain h(λ) =
DE(x(λ), y(λ)) − α˜.
As shown in Figure 2, h(λ) is a quasi-concave function
of λ, with the tails converging to −α˜. In other words, there
are at most two zero-crossings since the function h(λ) is
unimodal with the two tails converging to a value less than
zero. Therefore, there are at most two solutions to the equation
h(λ) = 0. The optimum sensor threshold can be found by
investigating the two zeros of h(λ), as suggested in Claim 2,
and comparing them in terms of DFC .
C. Discussion and Results
In this subsection, we first discuss the impact of the se-
crecy constraint on the performance of the sensor network.
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Obviously, when we consider α˜ = 0, the network achieves
perfect secrecy. But, this also forces the network to be blind
in that DFC → 0. On the other extreme, consider a scenario
where α˜ → ∞. This is equivalent to the case where there is
no eavesdropper present in the network. In other words, the
optimal quantizer is given by (x∞, y∞). For any finite α˜ > 0,
we numerically investigate the tradeoff between secrecy and
performance of a given distributed detection system.
Since α˜ is the tolerable limit on the performance of Eve, the
greater the information leakage we can tolerate, the better the
performance of the distributed detection network. This tradeoff
is captured by Figure 3, where the maximum DFC in the
presence of a constrained Eve increases with increasing α˜.
Note that, beyond a certain value of α˜, the maximum DFC
gets saturated to the optimal KLD at the FC in the absence
of Eve. This saturation level for this example is 5.8 and it is
dictated by the fundamental limits enforced by the imperfect
observations and channel models within the network.
Next, we demonstrate the impact of the Eve’s constraint on
the ROC, as well as the KL Divergence at the FC, in Figure
4, when the FC’s channels are ideal (ρfc = 0). Note that
this argument can be carried over to any general BSC at the
FC, as the operating point (xfc, yfc) is a linear transformation
of (x, y). In Figure 4, we assume ρe = 0.1 and consider two
different values of α˜. In Figure 4a, we plot the constraint curve
DE = α˜ along with the sensor’s ROC. Note that the constraint
curve intersects the LRT curve at two distinct points, as stated
earlier. One of these two intersection points (the intersection
point to the right, in this example) is optimal, as shown in
Figure 4b. Note that the skewness in the ellipses in Figure
4b is due to the asymmetry in the KL divergence. Also, as
α˜ decreases, DFC becomes deeper and flat-bottomed as a
function of x over the Eve’s constraint curve DE = α˜. Another
important observation to be made is the fact that the optimal
solution in the presence and absence of Eve (red curves)
always is on the boundary of the LRT curve, although the
thresholds vary depending on the scenario. Since the sufficient
test-statistic is the same irrespective of the presence or absence
of Eve, the network designer may implement the system in
terms of a threshold that can be varied.
In practice, there exist many conditional probability distribu-
tions p0(r) and p1(r) for which the computation of likelihood-
ratios is intractable. Also, there may be situations where these
distributions are not even known to the network designer. In
both these cases, the network designer may choose to employ
a tractable test that is not LRT.
Let Λ be the test-statistic employed in the sensor quantizer
γ, as defined in Equation (1). Note that, by allowing ran-
domization (linear stochastic combination of operating points)
between quantizers, Carathe`odary’s theorem [23] and Lemma
A.1 in Appendix A together makes every operating point (x, y)
inside the set Ψ , conv ({(x, y) | y ≤ gΛ(x)}) feasible,
where conv(S) represents the convex-hull of a given set S.
Since Ψi is convex, all of our arguments presented in
Section III also hold for the case of any general non-LRT
quantizer. We summarize this in the following claim:
Claim 3. Given any ROC curve y = gΛ(x) based on a test-
statistic Λ, the optimal quantizer that maximizes the FC’s KL
Divergence DFC in the presence of a constraint on Eve’s KL
Divergence DE = α˜ within the set Ψ˜i , conv{(x, y) | y ≤
gΛ(x)} always lies on the boundary of Ψ˜i.
As discussed earlier in this subsection, this optimal operat-
ing point can be implemented by randomizing over a finite set
of quantizers, all defined using the same test statistic Λ.
IV. EFFICIENT QUANTIZER DESIGN IN THE PRESENCE OF
NON-IDENTICAL SENSORS AND CHANNELS
In Section III, we investigated the case of identical sensors
and channels which was similar to the case of designing the
quantizer at a single sensor. In this section, we investigate
Problem 1 when the network has non-identical sensors and/or
has non-identical channels. Since Problem 1 is NP-Hard in
general, we propose an efficient methodology for quantizer
design that satisfies the Eve’s constraint DE ≤ α.
Note that the objective function DFC is linearly separable
since the sensor observations are conditionally independent.
Therefore, we define
Φn = Φn−1 +DFCn , ∀ n = 2, · · · , N. (18)
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Fig. 4: Sensor performance in the presence of a constraint, DE ≤ α˜, where ρe = 0.1.
where Φ1 = DFC1 . If, at any given intermediate stage, if Φn−1
is a constant, then the problem of maximizing Ψn reduces to
the problem of maximizing DFCn .
This above property of KL Divergence at the FC can
be used to decompose Problem 1 into N sub-problems by
breaking down the Eve’s constraint parameter α into α =
{α1, · · · , αN} using dynamic programming [25] that resem-
bles the waterfilling algorithm. Here, for the sake of ensuring
the feasibility of our solution, we assume the following.
N∑
i=1
αi ≤ α.
Therefore, for a given α, Problem 1 becomes:
Problem 3. For every i = 1, · · · , N , find
argmax
γ
DFCi s.t.
1. DEi ≤ αi
2. (xi, yi) ∈ Γi, for all i = 1, · · · , N.
Note that the performance of this proposed design-
methodology completely depends on the choice of α =
{α1, · · · , αN}. To be more precise, the exact solution to
Problem 1 can be equivalently expressed in terms of an
optimal decomposition of α into α = {α1, · · · , αN}. Since
the problem of finding optimal α is intractable, we present a
suboptimal (greedy) algorithm to find an efficient decomposi-
tion of α as follows.
Let D∗FCi denote the maximum KL Divergence achievable
at the FC, due to the ith sensor. In such a setting, Eve attains
a KL Divergence D∗Ei due to the i
th sensor. We define the
quality of the FC’s and the Eve’s channels corresponding
to the ith sensor as ki =
D∗FCi
D∗Ei
. The quality ki represents
the tradeoff between the detection performance and secrecy.
Let the sensors be ordered in terms of the increasing quality
as ki1 ≥ · · · ≥ kiN . In other words, we obtain the best
tradeoff in terms of the sensor quality by considering sensors
in the order of decreasing quality in our sequential allocation
mechanism. Therefore, we propose a greedy decomposition of
Problem 3 into N sequential problems based on the sensors’
quality, where α = {α1, · · · , αN} is chosen such that DFC is
maximized in the presence of Eve’s constraint DE ≤ α. Note
that this decoupling of α into α allows us to solve each of
the individual problems in Problem 3 using the same method
as presented in Section III.
Having ordered the nodes in terms of decreasing k∗i , we
know that node i achieves better tradeoff than node j, if i > j.
This allows us to select nodes with lower indices to achieve
the best tradeoffs between detection performance and secrecy
until the resource (constraint on Eve, α) is completely utilized.
Therefore, the decomposition of DFC , as shown in Equation
(18), allows us to sequentially select the individual sensors in
an increasing order of indices. Therefore, for index i = 1, we
allocate α1 = D∗E1 if α ≥ D
∗
E1
. Otherwise, α1 = α. Having
allocated the Eve’s constraint to Sensor 1, we move to Sensor
2. Now, the remaining tolerable leakage information at the
Eve is given by [α −D∗E1 ]+, where [x]+ = x if x ≥ 0, or, 0
otherwise. Therefore, we solve the problem at Sensor 2 with
a new constraint [α−D∗E1 ]+.
As the process of selecting the nodes progresses, we reach a
point where N∗ sensors are already selected and the remaining
resource left, given by α −
N∗∑
i=1
D∗Ei , is less than DEN∗+1 .
Therefore, we let αN∗+1 = α−
N∗∑
i=1
D∗Ei and let the remaining
sensors sleep in order to satisfy the secrecy constraint.
A. Numerical Results
In order to illustrate the performance of the proposed
algorithm, we consider a simple example where, for each
i = 1, · · · , N , the ith sensor’s observation follows N (0, σ2)
under hypothesis H0 and N (µi, σ2) under hypothesis H1.
Note that this example demonstrates a scenario where the
9signal source is spaced at different distances from different
sensors in the network, and the sensor observations are mod-
elled using a path-loss attenuation channel model. In such
a case, the detection probability at the ith sensor can be
defined as yi = Q
(
Q−1(x)− ηi
)
in terms of the false alarm
probability xi, where ηi = µiσ is the corresponding SNR.
Assuming that the FC has a perfect channel (ρfci = 0),
while the Eve has a binary symmetric channel with transition
probability ρei = ρi at the ith sensor, we have xfci = xi,
yfci = yi, xei = ρi+(1− 2ρi)xi and yei = ρi+ (1− 2ρi)yi.
Then, the KL divergences at the FC and Eve are computed as
shown in Equation (7).
For the sake of illustration, we consider a specific example
in order to demonstrate the performance of the proposed
greedy algorithm. We assume that all the sensors have identical
sensing channels by letting ηi = 1, for all i = 1, · · · , N .
The transition probabilities of the BSCs between the sensors
and the FC are sampled randomly from a uniform distribution
U(0, 0.01). Similarly, we let the Eve’s channels’ transition
probabilities be sampled randomly from a uniform distribution
U(0, 0.1). We present a single run of our simulation results in
Figure 5, where we present both the KL Divergence at the
FC and Eve, along with the number of sensors selected in the
network, as a function of N when α = 50. Note that, for
α = 50, the difference between the KL divergences between
the FC and Eve is about 40 units. We also provide an upper
bound on this difference using a benchmark comparison where
we present the case where the FC has ideal channels. In the
case where FC has ideal channels, the KL Divergences at
the FC and Eve are denoted as D˜FC and D˜E respectively.
Although the FC’s KL divergence is always lower-bounded by
Eve’s KL divergence, the difference in the KL Divergences at
the FC and Eve depend on the quality of the channels at both
FC and Eve.
Also, note that, in Figure 5a, as the number of sensors
increases, both DFC and DE monotonically increase until
N reaches a critical point where DE = α. Beyond this
critical point, the algorithm starts to select only those sensors
that are prioritized according to the decreasing order of ki.
Furthermore, in Figure 5b, the number of selected sensors
increases with increasing number of sensors in the network
at the similar rate as that of DFC . Lastly, note that the
performance of the distributed inference network in terms of
KL Divergence saturates as N increases as per intuition.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of designing
secure binary quantizers in a distributed detection network
in the presence of binary symmetric channels. In the case
of i.i.d. received symbols at the FC (likewise, i.i.d. received
symbols at the Eve), we proved that LRTs are optimal in the
presence of a tolerable constraint on Eve’s performance. We
proposed an algorithm to find the optimal LRT threshold, and
presented numerical results to illustrate the performance of
our network design. Furthermore, we also proposed efficient
quantizer designs in the general case of non-i.i.d. received
symbols at the FC and Eve by decomposing the original
problem into N sub-problems using a dynamic programming
approach. Numerical results were presented to illustrate the
efficiency of our proposed algorithm. In our future work,
we will investigate the optimal decomposition of the original
problem in the general case of non-i.i.d. received symbols
at the FC and Eve. In addition, we will also investigate
various mitigation schemes that enhance the performance of a
distributed detection network in the presence of eavesdroppers.
APPENDIX A
LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS OF SENSOR OPERATING
POINTS IN THE ROC SPACE
In this Appendix, we focus our attention on the transfor-
mation of the operating point of a single sensor due to the
presence of a binary symmetric channel (BSC) between a
given sensor and both the FC, as well as between the same
sensor and Eve. Let the operating point of a given quantizer
be A = (x, y). As mentioned earlier, the sensor’s quantizer
characteristics (x, y) are represented using its operating point
in the sensor’s ROC. Also, consider two BSCs with transition
probabilities ρ1 and ρ2, each of which transforms the operating
point A = (x, y) into B1 = (x1, y1) and B2 = (x2, y2). Let
C =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. In the following lemma, we present a useful
relationship between A, B1, B2 and C.
Lemma A.1. Let 0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 12 . Then, B1 and B2 always
lie on the line segment joining A and C. In addition, the
following inequality holds true.
x
y
≤
x1
y1
≤
x2
y2
≤ 1 ≤
1− x2
1− y2
≤
1− x1
1− y1
≤
1− x
1− y
(19)
Proof: Consider a BSC with transition probability ρ,
which transforms the operating point A = (x, y) into B =
(xˆ, yˆ). Then, the equation of the line joining A and B is given
by
b− y
a− x
=
b− yˆ
a− xˆ
(20)
where (a, b) is some arbitrary point on the line.
Substituting xˆ = ρ+ (1− 2ρ)x and yˆ = ρ+ (1− 2ρ)y, we
have
b− y
a− x
=
b − ρ− (1− 2ρ)y
a− ρ− (1− 2ρ)x
. (21)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (21), we have
(b− y)[a−ρ− (1− 2ρ)x] = (a−x)[b−ρ− (1− 2ρ)y]. (22)
Simplifying Equation (22), we have
(a− b) + (y − x) = 2(ay − bx). (23)
Note that the line a = b represents the set of operating
points for which the KL Divergence becomes zero. Therefore,
let us investigate the point where Equation (20) intersects the
line a = b. Substituting b = a, we have
(2a− 1)(y − x) = 0.
In other words, the line in Equation (20) intersects line a =
b = 1
2
for any transition probability ρ. In other words, the
points A, B1, B2 and C are collinear.
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2
, 1
2
)
B2 = (x2, y2)
B1 = (x1, y1)
A = (x, y)
Slope = y
x
Slope = 1−y
1−x
Slope = y1
x1
Slope = 1−y1
1−x1
Slope = y2
x2
Slope = 1−y2
1−x2
(0, 0)
(1, 1)
Fig. 6: Transformations in the ROC
In fact, as ρ → 1
2
, B → C. In other words, for a given
sensor’s operating point A, the transformed operating point B
slides along the line segment joining A and C. This sliding
behavior can be investigated by analyzing the distance between
B and C, in terms of increasing ρ, as shown in Figure 6. We
denote the Euclidian distance between B and C as φBC =√(
xˆ− 1
2
)2
+
(
yˆ − 1
2
)2
. Differentiating φBC with respect to
ρ, we have
dφBC
dρ
=
1
φBC
[(
xˆ−
1
2
)
(1− 2x) +
(
yˆ −
1
2
)
(1− 2y)
]
=
−1 + ρ+ (1 − 2ρ)[x(1− x) + y(1− y)]
φBC
= −
(
ρ+ (1 − 2ρ)[1− x(1 − x)− y(1− y)]
φBC
)
≤ 0,
(24)
since the function x(1− x) + y(1− y) is concave and attains
a maximum value of 1
2
at
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. In other words, B slides
towards C as ρ increases. Consequently, as shown in Figure
6, B1 is farther away from C than B2 on the line joining A
and C, since 0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 1.
Note that the slope of the line joining (0, 0) and B1 is y1x1 ,
and similarly, y2
x2
in the case of B2. Since B2 is closer to B1
to C, as shown in Figure 6, y1
x1
≥ y2
x2
and the slope tends to 1
as the transition probability approaches 1
2
. A similar argument
holds for the slope of the lines that join B1 and B2 with (1, 1).
Therefore, the inequality given in Equation (19) holds.
In order to understand the impact of this transformation on
the performance of the network, let us now analyze the KL
Divergence at some arbitrary operating point B = (xˆ, yˆ) due
to a BSC with transition probability ρ operating on the sensor
operating point A. In the following lemma, we show that the
KL Divergence decreases with increasing ρ.
Lemma A.2. Given the sensor operating point A = (x, y),
let B = (xˆ, yˆ) denote the transformed operating point due to
a BSC with transition probability ρ. Let DB denote the KL
Divergence at B. Then, for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
2
, DB is a monotonically
decreasing function of ρ whenever y ≥ x.
Proof: The KL Divergence at the transformed operating
point B is defined as follows.
DB = xˆ log
xˆ
yˆ
+ (1− xˆ) log
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
. (25)
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Differentiating DB with respect to ρ, we have
dDB
dρ
= (1− 2y)
[
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
]
−(1− 2x)
[
log
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
)
− log
(
xˆ
yˆ
)]
=
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
)
[(1 − 2y)
−(1− 2x)


log
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
)
− log
(
xˆ
yˆ
)
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ




(26)
From Lemma A.1, we have
xˆ
yˆ
≤
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
. (27)
In other words, 1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
≥ 0. Therefore, the sign of dDB
dρ
does not depend on 1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
.
Also, using the properties of the log(·) function, we have
1− yˆ
1− xˆ
≤
log
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
)
− log
(
xˆ
yˆ
)
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
≤
yˆ
xˆ
. (28)
Substituting Equation (28) in Equation (26), we have(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
)
−1
dDB
dρ
≤ (1− 2y)− (1− 2x)
{
1− yˆ
1− xˆ
}
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
)
−1
dDB
dρ
≤
−(y − x)
1− xˆ
(29)
Since dDB
dρ
≤ 0, DB is a monotonically decreasing func-
tion of ρ, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1
2
].
Having analyzed the impact of BSCs on the ROC, let us now
shift our focus on finding those quantizers that maximize the
KL Divergence at the sensor or the FC. Given any operating
point A = (x, y) at the sensor, we investigate the behavior of
DA with respect to y, for a fixed value of x.
Lemma A.3. The optimal quantizer always lies on the bound-
ary of the set of all feasible quantizer designs.
Proof: For a fixed value of x, we differentiate DA with
respect to y as follows.
dDA
dy
∣∣∣∣fixed x =
1− x
1− y
−
x
y
(30)
From Lemma A.1, we have
dDA
dy
∣∣∣∣fixed x ≥ 0. In other
words, DA is a monotonically increasing function of y, for a
fixed value of x. Hence, we are always interested in quantizer
rules whose operating points lie on the boundary of the set of
all feasible quantizers.
In summary, the sensor operating point chosen on the
LRT boundary slides towards the point (1
2
, 1
2
) as the channel
deteriorates (increasing ρ), which, in turn, degrades the KLD
of any decision rule γ to zero. Therefore, we address the
problem of finding the operating point on the boundary which
maximizes DFC , where the boundary is dictated by the Eve’s
constraint DE = α and the boundary of Γ = {Γ1, · · · ,ΓN}.
APPENDIX B
PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
To show that D is a convex function of x in the presence of a
constraint on Eve, we investigate the second-order differential
of D with respect to x.
The closed-form expression for the first-order differential of
D with respect to x
dD
dx
=
d
dx
[
x log
x
y
+ (1− x) log
(
1− x
1− y
)]
=
(
1− x
1− y
−
x
y
)
dy
dx
−
[
log
(
1− x
1− y
)
− log
(
x
y
)]
.
(31)
The second-order differential of D can therefore be obtained
by differentiating Equation (31) with respect to x as follows.
d2D
dx2
=
(
1− x
1− y
−
x
y
)
d2y
dx2
+
(
1− x
(1− y)2
+
x
y2
)(
dy
dx
)2
−2
(
1
y
+
1
1− y
)
dy
dx
+
(
1
x
+
1
1− x
)
.
(32)
Note that the first term in Equation (32) can be rewritten as
follows.
(
1− x
1− y
−
x
y
)
d2y
dx2
=
(
1− x
1− y
−
x
y
)
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
) (1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
)
d2y
dx2
=
yˆ(1− yˆ)
y(1− y)
·
1
(1− 2ρ)
·
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
−
xˆ
yˆ
)
d2y
dx2
(33)
Note that Equation (33) allows us to use the necessary
condition for the operating point (x, y) to lie on the Eve’s con-
straint curve DE = α˜, as given in Equation (10). Therefore,
we substitute Equation (10) from the Lemma 2 in Equation
(33), and use this in Equation (32) to have the following.
d2D
dx2
= T1
(
dy
dx
)2
− 2T2
dy
dx
+ T3 (34)
where
T1 =
(
1− x
(1− y)2
+
x
y2
)
−
yˆ(1− yˆ)
y(1− y)
(
1− xˆ
(1− yˆ)2
+
xˆ
yˆ2
)
(35a)
T2 =
(
1
y
+
1
(1− y)
)
−
yˆ(1− yˆ)
y(1− y)
(
1
yˆ
+
1
(1 − yˆ)
)
(35b)
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T3 =
(
1
x
+
1
(1− x)
)
−
yˆ(1 − yˆ)
y(1− y)
(
1
xˆ
+
1
(1 − xˆ)
)
. (35c)
It is easy to show that T2 = 0.
So, let us first consider T1. Expanding Equation (35a), we
have
T1 =
1
y2(1− y)2yˆ(1− yˆ)
[
(xyˆ − xˆy)− (xyˆ2 − xˆy2)
+yyˆ {(y − yˆ)− 2(x− xˆ) + 2(xyˆ − xˆy)}]
=
1
y2(1− y)2yˆ(1− yˆ)
[−ρ(y − x)
−
{
ρ2x− ρy2 + 2ρ(1− 2ρ)xy − 2ρ(1− 2ρ)xy2
}
+yyˆ(ρ− 2ρx)]
=
ρ(1− ρ)(y − x)(2y − 1)
y2(1 − y)2yˆ(1 − yˆ)
(36)
Similarly, expanding Equation 35c for T3, we have
T3 =
1
y(1− y)
[
y(1− y)
x(1 − x)
−
yˆ(1− yˆ)
xˆ(1− xˆ)
]
=
ρ(1− ρ)
y(1− y)
·
(y − x)(1 − x− y)
x(1 − x)xˆ(1− xˆ)
(37)
Substituting Equations (36) and (37) in Equation (34), we
simplify Equation (34) into the following.
d2D
dx2
=
ρ(1− ρ)(y − x)
y(1− y)
· T4 (38)
where
T4 =
2y − 1
yyˆ(1− y)(1− yˆ)
(
dy
dx
)2
+
1− x− y
xxˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
. (39)
Note that, if T4 ≥ 0, D is a convex function of x along the
Eve’s constraint curve DE = α˜. Since we are only interested
in the region where y ≥ x and ρ < 1
2
for all practical purposes,
we restrict our analysis of the sign of T4 in this region.
In order to analyze the sign of T4, we divide the achiev-
able region in the receiver-operating characteristics into three
regions, as shown in Figure 7.
R1 :
(
y ≤
1
2
)
&(x+ y ≤ 1)
R2 :
(
y ≥
1
2
)
&(x+ y ≤ 1)
R3 :
(
y ≥
1
2
)
&(x+ y ≥ 1) .
(40)
Obviously, in region R2, 2y − 1 ≥ 0 and 1 − x − y ≥ 0.
Therefore, d
2D
dx2
≥ 0. Henceforth, we analyse the sign of T4
in the remaining regions R1 and R3.
x
y
y =
1
2
x + y = 1R1
R2
R3
y = x
1
1
Fig. 7: Partition of ROC into three regions
Region R1: In this region, 2y−1 ≤ 0. Therefore, we use
the upper bound on dy
dx
, presented in Equation (13), to find the
sign of T4 as follows.
Substituting Equation (13) in Equation (39), we have
T4 ≥
1− x− y
xxˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
−
1− 2y
yyˆ(1 − y)(1− yˆ)
yyˆ
xxˆ
=
1
xxˆ
[
1− x− y
(1 − x)(1 − xˆ)
−
1− 2y
(1− y)(1− yˆ)
]
=
1
xxˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)(1− y)(1− yˆ)
·
[(1− x− y)(1 − y)(1− yˆ)− (1 − y)(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
+y(1− x)(1 − xˆ)]
(41)
Equation (41) can be rearranged as follows.
T4 ≥
(y − x)
[
y(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ)
{
(2y − 1)(1− x)− y2
}]
xxˆ(1 − x)(1 − xˆ)(1 − y)(1− yˆ)
(42)
Since 1 − x − y ≥ 0 in region R1, we have 1 − x ≥ y.
Therefore, substituting this inequality in Equation (42), we
have
T4 ≥
(y − x)
[
y(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ)
{
(2y − 1)y − y2
}]
xxˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)(1 − y)(1− yˆ)
=
(y − x) [y(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ)y(y − 1)]
xxˆ(1 − x)(1 − xˆ)(1 − y)(1− yˆ)
=
(y − x)y [(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ)(y − 1)]
xxˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)(1 − y)(1− yˆ)
=
(y − x)yyˆ
xxˆ(1 − x)(1 − xˆ)(1 − y)(1− yˆ)
≥ 0.
(43)
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Region R3: In this region, since 2y− 1 ≥ 0, we use the
lower bound on dy
dx
, presented in Equation (13), in order to
find the sign of T4.
Substituting Equation (13) in Equation (39), we have
T4 ≥
2y − 1
yyˆ(1− y)(1 − yˆ)
(1 − y)(1− yˆ)
(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
−
x+ y − 1
xxˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
=
1
(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
[
2y − 1
yyˆ
−
x+ y − 1
xxˆ
]
.
=
(yyˆ − xxˆ)− y(yyˆ − xxˆ)− xy(yˆ − xˆ)
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
=
1
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
[(1− y) {ρ(y − x)
+(1− 2ρ)(y2 − x2)
}
− xy(1− 2ρ)(y − x)
]
=
1
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
[(y − x) {ρ(1− y)
+(1− 2ρ)y(1− y)− (1− 2ρ)x(1 − 2y)}]
(44)
Since we are only interested in the region where y ≥ x,
Equation (45) can be lower-bounded as follows.
T4 ≥
1
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
[(y − x) {ρ(1− y)
+(1− 2ρ)x(1− y)− (1− 2ρ)x(1− 2y)}]
=
(y − x) [ρ(1− y) + (1− 2ρ)xy]
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1 − xˆ)
≥ 0.
(45)
Hence, for BSCs with ρ < 1
2
, D is a convex function of x
along the constraint DE = α.
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